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Indoctrination, Communicative Teaching and Recognition – Studies in Critical Theory and Democracy in Education

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Abstract


Articles 2 and 3 deal with the question of socialization and indoctrination. Indoctrination can be defined as infiltrating (drilling, inculcating etc.) concepts, attitudes, beliefs, and theories into a pupil’s or student’s mind by passing her free and critical deliberation. From the perspective of the modern Western worldview, the education in accordance with mechanical solidarity can be described with the term indoctrination. Mechanical solidarity is the solidarity between those individuals who think alike, act alike, have the same value system, speak the same language, etc. It is intolerant, doctrinaire and prejudiced. In a traditional society, highly individual personalities are perceived as a threat, not as a resource or potential.

Education and socialization in this traditional – i.e. indoctrinative – sense does not aim at an individual and autonomous personality. It
aims at traditional persons who think, speak, act, believe, etc. alike, and fear and dream the same things. In a traditional society, there is only one model of good life, and education is based on that model. According to Durkheim, in a society of mechanic solidarity there is very little room for individual thinking – that is, individual consciousness. In modern societies, identities are open to a certain extent. In a modern society, educational institutions leave or at least should leave the identity of an individual open. Modern personality is a kind of person who is capable of forming a critically reflective relation to tradition and can to a certain extent critically evaluate interpretations that the tradition consists of. The basic claim in the critical theory of sociology of education is that indoctrinative education prevents the formation of the modern personality and thus also prevents social criticism and critique of ideology.

The problem when educating modern personality is following: Where does autonomy come from if young pupils are not communicatively competent to critically evaluate the content of tradition? If critical learning requires critical evaluation and reflection of the tradition, a communicatively incompetent learner is unable to learn critically. Through what kind of learning process is a critical and communicatively competent subject formed? Asking this question is the same as asking how Bildung is possible. For this purpose, I have constructed a model of communicative teaching which tries to preserve the idea of critical learning while recognizing the authority of the teacher and tradition.

I define communicative teaching as including the value orientations by which the teacher commits herself to the “universal” presuppositions of argumentation and acts in accordance with these maxims as to the best of her ability. The phrase “as to the best of her ability” is needed because the pedagogical relationship can never be “symmetrical”. The best a teacher can do is to act as if the pupils were communicatively competent speakers. Of course, the pupils aren’t fully communicatively competent speakers, and that is why communicative teaching can never be the same as communicative action in the Habermasian sense. Nevertheless, a teacher must make an effort to orientate her actions towards communicative action and not towards strategic action. I claim that pedagogical communication is a kind of simulated communicative action and it is more simulated in the early stage of education.
Article 4 deals the question what could be a democratic way to create action norms in schools which at the same time could serve as the didactic of participatory democracy? In this article Huttunen & Heikkinen apply Habermas’s discourse theory of justice into democratic school management in order to find valid action norms. In his book Between Facts and Norms, Habermas develops the so-called process model of ideal rational will-formation. This model can be applied into school management. Habermas’s discourse theory of justice and model of ideal rational will-formation relies on the universal presuppositions of argumentation. From these presuppositions, Habermas deduces the so-called universality principle U and discourse principle D:

U: Norm is valid if all affected can accept the consequences and side effects its general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests.

D: Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse.

In a school “all affected in” includes, for example, the teachers, the parents and the pupils. Habermas’s discourse principle implies that pupils should also have the possibility to participate in the practical discourse insofar as their capacity to communicative action allows it. Of course, there will be great difficulties organizing a practical discourse in the Habermasian sense in a school. Seven year old pupils’ communicative competency for practical discourse is almost nonexistent. On the other hand, fifteen year old pupils have greater communicative skills than generally is expected.

Articles 5 and 6 deal with the theme of recognition in education and in the political action of critical adult education. The thing which Huttunen & Heikkinen call the positive circle of recognition is the ideal case of reciprocal relation of recognition. In the positive circle of recognition, trust, loyalty and spirit are constructed through a reciprocal relation of recognition. Everybody works for the common good, because they have achieved the experience that their contribution is needed and important. When somebody in the community gains success and receives recognition, others also take pleasure in it, because somebody else’s success and recognition is not “off from me” but quite contrary. The success of one creates possibilities for the others in the community, and one’s success is related
to previous successful contributions of other members of the community. A positive circle of recognition creates a strong feeling of solidarity which on the level of the state makes participatory democracy and active citizenship both possible and desired. Unfortunately, a negative and destructive circle of recognition usually prevails on the global, national and local levels. The situation in a negative circle of recognition resembles a Sartrean queue in which individuals are waiting on a line for some goods. Everybody in the queue hopes that the next person will drop out, and everybody takes care that the person behind her will not overhaul. This kind of a Sartrean queue is created both by social structures and learned personal attitudes.

In this respect, the nature of the learning community in which individuals learn basic attitudes towards meaningful others and towards strangers is very crucial. If the learning community itself works in line with the positive circle of recognition, it gives the learner a good personal disposition (habitus) for participating in democratic procedures and cooperative work. If the competitive spirit of the learning community resembles more a negative circle of recognition, then the prospects for participating in democratic institutions, and the future of democratic institutions itself, are in a bad shape.

Also critical adult education should itself work like a learning community in which the positive circle of recognition prevails and subjects aim at unforced common meanings. If a community of adult education (study group) itself works in an undemocratic way and if someone in that community (for example a teacher, an intellectual, an academically educated person, etc.) holds more authority and a more recognized voice than others, then the community just reinforces a social hierarchy instead of empowering itself. To teach critique of ideology with the attitude that only a teacher can really see behind the ideology means the same thing as trying to indoctrinate democracy. Of course, in an adult education group – if there is a teacher – the teacher holds some epistemological authority, but fundamentally his or her view of society and politics is not more correct than anyone else’s. Also, in critical adult education we should avoid indoctrination and follow the idea of a communicative teaching in which the teacher and the learners together participate in the creation of a common meaning. Only on this foundation, critical adult education can inspire persons for authentic political action both in the sense of politics of recognition and politics of redistribution.
TIIVISTELMÄ


Määrittelen kommunikatiiviseen opettamiseen kuuluvaksi sellaisen arvo-orientaation, jossa opettaja sitoutuu argumentatiivisen toiminnan yleisini ehtoihin ja toimii niiden mukaisesti parhaan kykyyn mukaan. Fraasi ”parhaan kykyyn mukaan” on tarpeen, koska pedagoginen suhde ei voi koskaan olla ”symmetrinen”. Parasta mitä opettaja voi tehdä, on käyttää, kuin oppilaat olisivat kommunikatiivisesti kompetentteja puhujia. Tietenkään oppilaat eivät ole täysin kommunikatiivisesti kompetentteja puhujia ja siksi kommunikatiivinen opettaminen ei koskaan voi olla sama asia kuin kommunikatiivinen toiminta habermasilaisessa mielessä. Kuitenkin opettajan on ponnisteltava orientoidakseen toimintansa kommunikatiiviseen toimintaan eikä strategiseen toimintaan. Väitän, että pedagoginen kommunikaa-
tion on eräänlaista simuloitua kommunikatiivista toimintaa ja sen sitä enemmän simuloitua, mitä nuorempia oppilaita ovat.

Artikkelin 4 käsittelee kysymystä siitä, mikä voisi olla demokraattinen tapa luoda toiminta normit kouluihin tavalla, joka samaan aikaan voisi toimia osallistuvan demokratian didaktiikkana. Tässä artikkelissa Huttunen & Heikkinen soveltavat Habermasin oikeuden diskurssiteoriaa koulun demokraattiseen hallintoon validien toimintanormien löytämiseksi. Kirjassaan Faktizität und Geltung Habermas kehittää niin sanotun rationaalisen tahdonmuodostuksen ideaalin prosessimallin. Tätä mallia voidaan soveltaa koulun hallinnointiin. Tämä malli on usein argumentatiivisen toiminnan yleisin ehtoihin, joista Habermas dedusoi universaalisuus prinsipin U ja diskurssiprinsipin D:

U: Normi pätee, jos kaikki sen vaikutuspiirissä olevat voivat hyväksyä sen seuraukset ja sivuvaikutukset, jotka ovat yleisesti nähtävissä.

D: Vain niitä normeja voidaan pitää pätevinä, jotka kaikki vaikutuspiirissä olevat hyväksyvät (tai voisivat hyväksyä) praktisessa diskurssissa, johon he osallistuvat kapasiteettinsa mukaisesti.

Kouluiissa vaikutuspiirin kuuluvat muun muassa opettajat, vanhemmat ja oppilaita. Habermasin diskurssiperiaate implikoi sen, että oppilaila pitäisi myös olla mahdollisuus osallistua praktiseen diskurssiin niin paljon, kuin heidän kapasiteettinsa kommunikatiiviseen toimintaan antaa myöten. Tietenkin on suuria vaikeuksia organisoida kouluiissa habermasilainen praktinen diskurssi. 7-vuotiailla oppilailla praktiseen diskurssiin vaadittava kommunikatiivinen kompetenssi on lähes olematon. Toisaalta 15-vuotiailla oppilailla on suuremmat kommunikatiiviset taidot kuin yleisesti oletetaan.

Artikkeleissa 5 ja 6 käsitellään tunnustuksen teemaa opetuksessa ja kriittisen aikuiskasvatuksen poliittisessa toiminnassa. Asia jota Huttunen & Heikkinen kutsuvat tunnustuksen positiiveiseksi kehäksi on vastavuoroisten tunnustussuhteiden ideaalitapaus. Tunnustuksen positiiveissä kehässä luottamus, lojaalisuus ja henki muodostuvat tunnustuksen vastavuoroisten suhteiden kautta. Kaikki työskentelevät yhteisen hyvän eteen, koska heillä kaikilla on kokemus siitä, että heidän panoksensa on tarpeellinen ja tärkeä. Kun joku yhteisössä saavuttaa menestystä ja tunnustusta, myös muut nauttivat siitä, koska tämä toisen saavuttama menestys ja tunnustus eivät ole poissa keneltäkään muulta vaan päinvastoin. Yhden menestystä luo mahdollisuuksia muille yhteis-


Dedication

To my wife Leena Kakkori
for her loving support and encouragement
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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Indoctrination and socialization

A central theme in education and sociology of education is the role of educational institutions in the socialization process. In the era of the modern industrial society, we tend to understand the role of educational institutions in the spirit of the Enlightenment. The spirit of the Enlightenment includes such ideas as Bildung (including the right to education), democracy, habeas corpus (the right to physical and social integrity), the welfare state\(^1\), the right to one’s own political and religious convictions, etc. In pre-modern traditional societies, the function of education was to reproduce the existing value system and the system of social order as such. The principal form of education in traditional (pre-modern) societies was home education, or upbringing in the family environment, and its purpose was solely to socialize the new generation into their parents’ values and social occupation. According to Emile Durkheim, in this kind of society the so-called mechanical solidarity prevails (Durkheim 1964).

In every society, some part of a person’s identity is solidified as a result of primary socialization, but in traditional societies socialization tends to produce “sameness” and “staticness”. In traditional societies, education tends to produce closed and static identities with pure tolerance of strangeness. In Durkheimian spirit, we can claim that a traditional society does not give an individual the possibility to creatively develop their own personal identity and life plan. In a traditional society, due to the low degree of division of labor, social integration takes place mainly in the form of mechanical solidarity. It means solidarity between those individuals who think alike, act alike, have the same value system, speak the same language, etc. Mechanical solidarity is intolerant, doctrinaire and prejudiced. In a traditional society, highly individual personalities are perceived as a threat, not as a resource or potential. A traditional society tends to produce a static form of personality, which I call a traditional personality. A traditional personality

\(^1\) The role of education in the formation of a welfare state, see example Torres & Antikainen 2003.
is a person who has been socialized under the structures of mechanical solidarity².

Mechanical solidarity and the traditional form of personality do not solely belong to the past, traditional society. The present, modern society still carries many features of mechanical solidarity, and its institutions (education, army, church, media, etc.) sometimes tend to uphold the traditional form of personality. In modern societies, there are institutions and social processes which tend to produce mechanical solidarity and there are institutions and social processes which tend to produce organic solidarity. I understand the concepts of mechanical and organic solidarity – and the corresponding forms of personality – as ideal types which depict the contradictory nature of modern society.

There are many features of mechanic solidarity also in the Finnish society, although Finland is a modern society. This concerns the Finnish educational system, as well. Both Sakari Suutari (2000) and Margaret Trota Tuomi (2001) point out that textbooks in schools consistently avoid ethnic descriptions and try to present the Finns as a homogeneous people. In tuition, there is an unwillingness to cover ethnic and cultural diversity among Finnish-speaking regions, because the function of the school is understood as promoting national uniformity in the spirit of the Fennomans. According to Tuomi, these empirical findings support Bourdiue’s (1990) claim that schools see their function as one to maintain the status quo (See Tuomi 2001, 23).

From the perspective of the modern Western worldview, the education in accordance with mechanical solidarity can be described with the term indoctrination. The concept of indoctrination in its modern critical meaning was invented by William Heard Kilpatrick. Indoctrination can be defined as infiltrating (drilling, inculcating etc.) concepts, attitudes, beliefs, and theories into a pupil’s or student’s mind by passing her free and critical deliberation³. According to Kilpatrick, in a traditional society this kind of education was more a norm than an exception (Kilpatrick 1972, 47–48):

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² See article Reviving the Gadamer-Habermas Debate in the Context of Theory of Indoctrination.

³ See article Habermas and the Problem of Indoctrination.
The word [indoctrination] means, literally, implanting doctrines. When such implanting on an uncritical basis was the common practice of the school and indeed one of its principal aims, to indoctrinate and to teach came to be [nothing] but diverse ways of describing the same process… But with the development of democracy and the coming of modern rapid change, it was increasingly felt that education could no longer be content with inducing uncritical belief, but must instead develop responsible thinking on the part of all as a necessary preparation for democratic living and citizenship and an unpredictable future.

Education and socialization in this traditional – i.e. indoctrinative – sense does not aim at an individual and autonomous personality. It aims at traditional persons who think, speak, act, believe, etc. alike, and fear and dream the same things. In a traditional society, there is only one model of good life, and education is based on that model. According to Durkheim, in a society of mechanic solidarity there is very little room for individual thinking – that is, individual consciousness. Durkheim claims that humans have two consciousnesses. One form of consciousness is common for a group or for the whole society, and the other form is an individual consciousness which makes us individual persons. Durkheim defines the term person in the following way (1961, 51): “To say that one is a person is to say that he is distinct from all others.” When mechanical solidarity is at its strongest, the collective consciousness almost entirely covers the individual consciousness and there is only minimal distinction between individuals – so minimal that we cannot speak about true persons. I refer to the form of personality that is related to mechanical solidarity with the term traditional personality. In a traditional society a person’s individuality is minimal. When mechanical solidarity prevails, the individual is more like the collective than a personal being. Traditional personality is not personhood at all in the modern sense of the word. “Whereas the previous type [mechanical solidarity] implies that individuals resemble each other, this type [organic solidarity] presumes their difference. The first is possible only in so far as the individual personality is absorbed into collective personality; the second is possible only if each has a sphere of action which is peculiar to him; that is, a personality” (Durkheim 1964, 131).

In modern societies, identities are open to a certain extent. In a modern society, educational institutions leave or at least should leave
the identity of an individual open. The individual tends to remain somewhat “incomplete“ in a modern society. The modern person is conscious of her capacity to change her own identity, and she possesses the perspective of many possible identities (Berger, Berger & Kellner 1973, 73). This relatively open form of identity produces the pluralisation of life-worlds and meaning perspectives. The pluralisation of life-worlds, then, makes possible conducting one’s own life plan. The fundamental feature of a modern person is that she conducts her own life plan which becomes the primary source of her identity. Conducting the life plan means conducting one’s own identity, personhood and selfhood (Berger, Berger & Kellner 1973, 70–71). Beck, Giddens & Lash call this same phenomenon reflexive modernity (Beck, Giddens & Lash 1994). Education is a precondition for reflexive modernity. Without proper education an individual does not gain means for designing her own life plan⁴.

The pluralization of life-worlds is connected to the pluralization of worldviews. At the heart of Habermas’s theory of communicative action is the vision that the modern world-view is differentiated into three parts. Following Immanuel Kant and Karl Popper, Habermas distinguishes the objective world, the social world and the subjective world. A communicatively competent speaker can independently present differentiated statements concerning any of these three worlds. She can independently evaluate any statement about the world with proper validity claims. There are three validity claims for these three worlds:

1) Truth (Wahrheit). A claim that refers to the objective world is valid if it is true, i.e. if it corresponds to the reality.

2) Truthfulness (Wahrhaftigkeit). A claim that refers to the subjective world is valid if it is honest, i.e. if it has an authentic relationship with the subjective world.

3) Rightness (Richtigkeit). A claim that refers to the social world is valid if it does not contradict commonly agreed social norms (Habermas 1984, 440).

⁴ One way to study life plans and identity formation is the biographical method. See Huttunen, Heikkinen & Syrjälä 2002 on biographical research in education. See Antikainen & Komonen 2003 on biographical research in sociology of education.
Habermas claims that expansion and deepening of action-orientated understanding (contra to orientation to exploitation, utilization, and manipulation) is not possible without pluralization of worldviews, secularization of worldviews and the genesis of communicatively competent speaker. Only this way the actor and the speaker can have a critically reflective relation to tradition and the interpretations that are embodied in tradition. I define the ideal type of the modern personality likewise. She is a kind of person who is capable of forming a critically reflective relation to tradition and can to a certain extent critically evaluate interpretations that the tradition consists of. The basic claim in the critical theory of sociology of education is that indoctrinative education prevents the formation of the modern person and thus also prevents social criticism and critique of ideology.

According to Hans-Georg Gadamer, a critically reflective relation to tradition is impossible because we are products of tradition. Everything that we do or think stays within the tradition. There is no break or escape from tradition even in the case of social revolution, through which the all existing social institutions are replaced with new ones. For Gadamer, Bildung is socialization into tradition and its values. Gadamer thinks that we must first understand the tradition and open up to the tradition before we can evaluate and renew it. Habermas wants to us have a critical and reflective attitude to begin with and demands us to trust our own power of judgment. In the Habermasian model of critical learning, the Enlightened Cartesian and Kantian autonomic subject postpones prejudices and authority until she has decided which part of the tradition is worth saving.

Of course, the problem here is: Where does this Kantian autonomic subject come from if not from the process of education itself? How can a student or a pupil exercise her Kantian autonomy towards tradition in the process of education, if Kantian autonomy is an outcome of education? This situation is called the pedagogical paradox (see Uljens 2001).

Gadamer and Durkheim avoid the pedagogical paradox by identifying education with socialization. Education is the process through

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5 See article *Reviving the Gadamer-Habermas Debate in the Context of Theory of Indoctrination*.

6 On the critical Bildung Theory, see Sünker 2006, 13-23.
which an individual adopts the content of a tradition and becomes a mature member of a community. An individual must first grow into a tradition before she can evaluate the content of the tradition. Durkheim’s view is more or less the same, though he lays more emphasis on the socially functionalistic role of educational institutions. Durkheim defines education in the following way (Durkheim 1956, 71):

Education is the influence exercised by adult generations on those that are not yet ready for social life. Its object is to arouse and to develop in the child a certain number of physical, intellectual and moral states which are demanded of him by both the political society as a whole and the special milieu for which he is specifically destined.

According to Paul Fauconnet’s interpretation of Durkheim, autonomy is the attitude of a will that accepts rules because the will recognizes their rational ground. First a child receives rules from society. The child is not able to evaluate which rules are valid and which need to be either rejected or renewed. Only autonomic attitude is capable of this evaluation, and autonomy grows gradually in the process of education (Fauconnet in Durkheim 1956, 45). Habermas, on the other hand, claims that evaluation of rules and norms, which happens afterwards, is bound to tradition. Habermas claims that if the only basis for validity of norms is tradition (like legal positivism states), then no one possesses true autonomy. Nevertheless, the Habermasian model of education cannot escape the pedagogical paradox. Where does autonomy come from if young pupils are not communicatively competent to critically evaluate the content of tradition? If critical learning requires critical evaluation and reflection of the tradition, a communicatively incompetent learner is unable to learn critically. Through what kind of learning process is a critical and communicatively competent subject formed? Asking this question is the same as asking how Bildung is possible, because Bildung means formation of a mature (Mündigkeit) subjectivity. For this purpose, I have constructed a model of communicative teaching which tries to preserve the idea of critical learning while recognizing the authority of the teacher and tradition7.

7 This is also the basic intention of the pedagogy of Paolo Freire. For example Raymond Allen Morrow and Alberto Carlos Torres (2002) have written on convergence between Freire and Habermas.
The idea of communicative teaching requires the so-called universal presuppositions of argumentation (Habermas 1990, 88–89):
(2.1) Every speaker may assert only what he really believes.
(2.2) A person who disputes a proposition or norm under discussion must provide a reason for wanting to do so.
(3.1) Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a discourse.
(3.2) A) Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever.  
          B) Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse.  
          C) Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires and needs.
(3.3) No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising his rights as laid down in (3.1) and (3.2).

Sheila Benhabib has condensed these presuppositions by saying that valid consensus can only be achieved by communication that is symmetrical, reciprocal and reflective (Benhabib 1986, 285).

In the article Habermas and the Problem of Indoctrination, I define communicative teaching as including the value orientations by which the teacher commits herself to the “universal” presuppositions of argumentation and acts in accordance with these maxims as to the best of her ability (Huttunen 2003). The phrase “as to the best of her ability” is needed because the pedagogical relationship can never be “symmetrical”. The best a teacher can do is to act as if the pupils were communicatively competent speakers. Of course, the pupils aren’t fully communicatively competent speakers, and that is why communicative teaching can never be the same as communicative action in the Habermasian sense. Nevertheless, a teacher must make an effort to orientate her actions towards communicative action and not towards strategic action. I claim – following Jaan Masschelein (1991, 42) – that pedagogical communication is a kind of simulated communicative action and it is more simulated in the early stage of education. When a teacher teaches seven year old pupils, the words “to the best of her ability” have different practical consequence than in the case of a university teacher teaching twenty year old students. The value orientation is the same, but the practise or application of presuppositions of argumentation is different. When we understand communicative
teaching in this way, as an exceptional form of communicative action, the concept of communicative teaching is looser than the concept of communicative action itself. I would like to think that communicative teaching – as an exceptional application of communicative action – still remains within the realm of communicative action, although teachers sometimes use language in a strategic way – that is, in a way that is not fully transparent to the pupils.\(^8\)

Using the concept of communicative teaching, I reconstruct the so-called communicative criterion of indoctrination. I agree with William Kilpatrick’s claim that the most important element in non-indoctrinative teaching is respect for other persons. Respect for other persons is also the essence of Habermas’s concept communicative action. In a Habermasian manner, I define strategic teaching as the kind of teaching in which the teacher treats her students solely as objects, as objects of series of didactical maneuvers. This kind of teaching is typical to a traditional society, and it tends to produce traditional personalities. In a modern society, strategic teaching is a form of indoctrination (although strategic teaching is not the same as indoctrination), through which the teacher tries to transfer the content of tuition to the students’ or pupils’ minds, treating them merely as passive objects, not as active co-subjects of the learning process. In this case, teaching is in no sense simulation of communicative action but pure strategic action.

Communicative teaching is contradictory to strategic teaching. Its aim is to bring about a communicatively competent speaker who does not need to rely on the teacher, or any other authority for that matter. In communicative teaching, students and pupils are not treated as passive objects but as active learners. In communicative teaching, the teacher and her students co-operatively participate in the formation of meanings and new perspectives. In communicative teaching, the teacher does not impose her ideas on the students, but rather they make a joint effort to find a meaningful insight regarding the issues at hand. Communicative teaching is as close as possible to the ideal of communicative action that it can get in a real teaching situation. Communicative teaching is a simulation of commu-

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\(^8\) Pentti Moilanen (1998) makes a bold statement by demanding that at least in teacher education a lecturer’s all pedagogical acts must be fully transparent to the students. Moilanen claims that a lecturer is allowed to – or has no choice but to – use strategic action in teaching, but the strategic action must be open.
Communicative action, a simulation of a free and equal discourse. It is also a simulation of democracy and democratic mode of action. This means that communicative teaching cannot take place in a school if the school does not work in a democratic way. Every attempt to avoid indoctrination in schools will remain insufficient unless no effort is made to practice democracy in action.

My unique contribution to the theory of indoctrination is to bring the aspect of sociology (social theory) and critical theory into the discussion. The discussion concerning the theory of indoctrination is even today limited by analytical philosophy to the (unsocial) concept of action and to methodological individualism. On the other hand, I want to contribute to sociology of education by bringing the aspect of the indoctrination into it. Sociology of education does not properly recognize the concept of indoctrination which is an important social aspect of education. Sociology of education deals with the same kind of problem under the headings of ideology, hidden curriculum, power in education, symbolic control in education, codes in pedagogic discourse, knowledge structures in education, authoritarianism in education, reproduction of cultural and socio-economical classes in education, biopower in schools, racial and gender discrimination in schools, political economy of educational symbols, etc.

Regardless of the fact that the theory of indoctrination and sociology of education sometimes come very close to each other, so far there is no proper sociological theory of indoctrination. For example, in the anthology *Towards Sociology of Education* edited by John Beck et al., the term *indoctrination* is mentioned once in the context of “natural training of social character” by Raymond Williams, who is not a scholar of sociology of education (Williams 1978, 390). Nevertheless, Raymond Williams is right. When we speak of social character and its formation, we should take into account the aspect of indoctrination. Also Ivan Illich uses the term *indoctrination* once in his book *Deschooling Society* (Illich 1971), but he refers to a different phenomenon. Likewise, Michael W. Apple (1980, 28) mentions the term once in his book *Ideology and Curriculum*, in the context of the progressive educational movement in the United States and progressive educators’ discussion on the question whether school curriculums should be guided by a vision of a more just society (see Kilpatrick 1972, 49–50; 54). Possibly closest to the theory of indoctrination come Basil Bern-

Nevertheless, I claim that none of these concepts which have been used in sociology of education to study phenomena similar to indoctrination do cover all the aspects that the concept of indoctrination brings about. For example, we can imagine a teaching situation in which ideological distortion and authoritarian compulsion is minimal but teaching still is highly indoctrinative. This is the case in a situation in which a teacher excludes all uncomfortable issues (sexuality, moral conflicts, politically sensitive issues etc.) from her tuition. The goal of unindoctrinative education is to improve pupils’ and students’ own power of judgment especially concerning ethically and politically sensitive issues. The case in which the teacher or the curriculum (intentionally or unintentionally) excludes all uncomfortable teaching content is a form of indoctrination which leaves the students’ power of judgment in an immature state (example Puolimatka 1996, 155). When education systematically leaves pupils or students in an immature state, it is indoctrination *par excellence*. This is an important social aspect of education, and sociology of education cannot grasp it without the concept of indoctrination.

In the article *Habermas and the Problem of Indoctrination*, I propose new criteria for indoctrination greatly inspired by Habermas’s communicative theory of action and the idea of reflective modernity. One might ask what practical significance these criteria have, for example, for contemporary education in Finland. I have presented these criteria in the interest of improving curriculums and educational practices. In the Finnish context, the so-called traditional (common) theory of indoctrination is quite useless. The traditional theory connects indoctrination with the authoritarian teaching method (method criterion), doctrinal teaching content (content criterion), the teacher’s indoctrinative intention (intention criterion), and the notion of the indoctrinated (consequence criterion). In the Finnish and the Nordic contexts,
teaching methods are rarely authoritarian, the content of tuition does not contain pure religious or political doctrines (except religious classes in schools), professional teachers hardly intentionally indoctrinate anyone, and it is quite unfair to say that public educational institutions in Scandinavia systematically produce indoctrinated persons. Despite of this, I do not mean to say that indoctrinative processes do not happen in a modern teaching situation even in the Nordic context.

The danger of indoctrination is present in modern societies, but the traditional theory of indoctrination does not recognize it. We must become sensitive for new forms of indoctrination. In the modern teaching situation, many unreflected prejudices – concerning sexual orientation, cultural background, gender issues, nationality, etc. – are still passed on to the next generation. We still need the theory of indoctrination when we plan curriculums and develop teacher education, but the traditional theory of indoctrination does not suffice. We need a (reflexively) modern theory of indoctrination, and it is precisely my intention to present ideas for such a theory.

1.2 Learning democracy and valid action norms in schools

Unindoctrinative teaching and democracy are inherently interconnected. Avoiding indoctrination is a precondition for the formation of a modern person and of democracy as a personal virtue. It is also true that one cannot learn a democratic attitude and democratic discussion culture just by memorization and cramming. One cannot learn to be democratic by indoctrination. A report by UNESCO describes the relation between indoctrination and democracy in a similar manner (Delors et al. 1998, 50): “The aim is not to teach moral principles as rigid rules, in an indoctrination-like way, but to introduce democratic practices into the school.”

My idea of communicative teaching serves as a kind of simulation of a democratic discussion inside the classroom. In communicative teaching, the both teacher and the pupils make an effort to find a common meaning. Of course, the teacher has the leading role in pedagogical communication, and that is why a communicative pedagogical relationship still is only a simulation of proper communicative action and democratic dialogue. Nevertheless, communicative teach-
ing is a way to learn democratic discussion procedures. The teacher cannot teach democracy if she practices the so-called strategic teaching and treats pupils as if they were natural objects which the teacher just manipulates. This is the reason why it is very difficult to import democratic procedures into a country in which educational institutions aim at indoctrination.

Nevertheless, it is difficult to learn a democratic attitude, a trust in democracy, and a democratic discussion culture just by simulation. At its best, communicative teaching is a simulation of democratic dialogue (i.e. communicative action), but a simulation cannot serve as a substitute for the real thing. It does not matter how well a simulation of democratic dialogue is executed inside the classroom if the school itself and the educational policy on the national level work in an authoritarian and undemocratic manner. One cannot learn democracy in an undemocratic social context. If a discussion situation in the classroom is held in democratic spirit but the school is administrated in an undemocratic manner, there will be no successful socialization of democratic procedures. The situation might create a caricature image of democracy into the pupils’ minds. This is certainly not the way to foster a democratic attitude and a modern person. Instead, it could be a hidden curriculum of pseudo democracy. Communicative teaching aims at the idea of radical democracy which differs from the idea of democracy of political liberalism. According to Axel Honneth, the essence of the liberalist concept of democracy includes “limiting the participatory activity of citizen to the function of periodically legitimating the state’s exercise of power” (Honneth 2007, 218). Honneth claims that we can find from John Dewey’s mature work *The Public and Its Problems* (Dewey 1991) a more radical and richer concept of democracy than the current hegemonic notion of democracy of political liberalism.

What could then be a democratic way to create action norms in schools which at the same time could serve as the didactic of participatory democracy? In the article *Between Facts and Norms – Action Research in the Light of Jürgen Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action and Discourse Theory of Justice*, Huttunen & Heikkinen (1998) apply Habermas’s discourse theory of justice into democratic school management in order to find valid action norms. In his book *Between Facts and Norms*, Habermas develops the so-called process model of
ideal rational will-formation (Habermas 1996, 168). This model can be applied into school management. Habermas’s discourse theory of justice and model of ideal rational will-formation relies on the universal presuppositions of argumentation. From these presuppositions, Habermas deduces the so-called universality principle U and discourse principle D (Habermas 1996, 65–66):

- **U**: Norm is valid if all affected can accept the consequences and side effects its general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests.
- **D**: Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse.

In a school “all affected in” includes, for example, the teachers, the parents and the pupils. It is clear, at least in the Nordic countries, that the teachers and the parents should have the possibility to participate in school management. How about the pupils? Habermas’s discourse principle implies that pupils should also have the possibility to participate in the practical discourse insofar as their capacity to communicative action (the level of communicative competence) allows it. Of course, there will be great difficulties organizing a practical discourse in the Habermasian sense in a school. Seven year old pupils’ communicative competency for practical discourse is almost nonexistent. On the other hand, fifteen year old pupils have greater communicative skills than generally is expected.

The Habermasian model of ideal rational will-formation does not tell us how pupils should be given the possibility to participate in school democracy. but it gives us the general idea how a democratic practical discourse should be organized so that all affected can participate in the democratic process in its different phases. Huttunen & Heikkinen apply the Habermasian model into school management in the following way:
Figure 1. The process model of rational collective will-formation in developing action norms for school management (Heikkinen & Huttunen 1998)

The first question in a practical discourse on the level of a single school is “What should be done in schools?”. The level of practical discourse on which this basic question can be presented is the so-called *pragmatic discourse*. It might happen that consensus on the concrete action norms is achieved in this general practical discourse, but in many cases the question concerning the concrete action norm in school life is either related to deeper values or to interests of different interests.
groups (teacher, parents, and pupils). If the problem is related to interests groups, a new discourse called *procedurally regulated bargaining* should be opened. If the problem is related to the school’s values, a new discourse called *ethical-political discourse* should be opened. Sometimes it could be difficult to differentiate which questions are value questions and which are related to material interests. The outcome (a common proposal for a new action norm) of pragmatic and ethical political discourses and procedurally regulated bargaining should then be subordinated to a moral discourse in which the matter is treated according to universal interests. If consensus is achieved in the moral discourse, the results are submitted to legal discourses in which the consistency of the law is verified. A legal discourse is not necessary for every concrete action norm in a school.

Like I mentioned earlier, Habermas’s discourse theory of justice does not provide a solution to the question of how pupils should take part this practical discourse on the level of a single school. Nevertheless, we can say for sure that if such possibility does not exist in a school at all, no valid action norms can be created in the Habermasian sense. The same conclusion can be drawn from Theodor Adorno’s (1998) and Heinz Sünker’s (2006, 105–116) idea of a “democratic Bildung theory”.

What can be done in Finnish schools to improve pupils’ opportunities to participate in democratic processes and to learn this way democracy in action? A project called “Nuorten Ääni” (The Voice of Young) in Helsinki shows us very interesting prospects. The project is run by the city of Helsinki, and it is a part of democracy education. The basic idea is to develop and improve the youth’s partnership in social interaction. The project includes many different kinds of activity, but the most important form of participation is that the young can vote on the funding for things and improvements in the school that they feel are important and needed. Starting from the year 2008, “Nuorten Ääni” has been a part of the basic operations of the city of Helsinki. In 2008, 142 schools were participating in the project. Every year, the pupils in those schools consider which things, projects or reparations (of the school building) most crucially need funding. In this

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9 See the project’s website at: <http://www.hel.fi/wps/portal/Nuorisoasiain-eksku/Artikkeli?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/Nk/fi/Osallistu+ja+vaikuta/Hesan+Nuorten+___ni>
way, the city of Helsinki tries to socialize the young into democratic procedures by allowing them to participate in democratic deliberation on real issues. This is only one but a very promising attempt to really teach democracy.

1.3 Democracy and recognition in education

The formation of a modern and democratic mode of personality is also connected to the reciprocal process of recognition. Both Friedrich Hegel and Georg Herbert Mead considered the process of recognition as a genesis of personal identity. Hegel’s phrase “reconciled with others” means that only by receiving recognition from others a person achieves her own identity. A person cannot learn to know her special characteristic without a relation with others. George Herbert Mead learned this Hegelian concept of identity formation – which is at the same time the development of Spirit (see Williams 1992, 73–94) – from Wilhelm Dilthey, whose lectures he attended while studying in Germany (see Miller 1988). Later Mead created a sociological theory on identity by redefining the terms I, Me and Myself (Mead 1983). These concepts correspond Hegel’s three phases of spirit: spirit in-itself, for-itself and in-and-for-itself.

Following Hegel and Mead, Axel Honneth claims that to achieve a productive relationship with themselves, humans require intersubjective recognition of their abilities and achievements. If this social recognition fails to happen, it might cause a psychological gap within the personality which is expressed as a reaction of shame, anger or contempt (Honneth 1995, 257). From the reciprocal relation of recognition grows a person’s moral consciousness. According to Honneth’s interpretation of Hegel, morality is developed on the grounds of the negative and positive feedback a person receives in the struggle (strive) for recognition. The person’s level of morality depends on the level of recognition received. In Honneth’s theory, there are three levels of the

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10 I would like to acknowledge researcher Anja Karhunen for giving me inside information on the project “Nuorten Ääni”.

11 See articles Teaching and the Dialectic of Recognition by Huttunen & Heikkinen and Critical Adult Education and the Political-Philosophical Debate between Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth by Huttunen.
struggle for recognition, which correspond to the Hegelian terminology of family, civil society and State:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>dimension of personality</th>
<th>needs and emotions</th>
<th>moral responsibility</th>
<th>traits and abilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>forms of recognition</td>
<td>primary relationships (family)</td>
<td>legal relations (civil society)</td>
<td>community of value (state)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>love, friendship</td>
<td>rights</td>
<td>solidarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>practical relation-to-self</td>
<td>self-confidence</td>
<td>self-respect</td>
<td>self-esteem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>forms of disrespect</td>
<td>abuse and rape</td>
<td>denial of rights, exclusion</td>
<td>denigration, insult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>threatened component of personality</td>
<td>physical integrity</td>
<td>social integrity</td>
<td>honour dignity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2. *The structure of intersubjective relations of recognition (modified from Honneth 1994, 211; and 1996, 129)*

These three levels of the struggle for recognition correspond to three forms of self-relation: 1) self-confidence (*Selbstvertrauen*), 2) self-respect (*Selbstachtung*), and 3) self-esteem (*Selbstschätzung*). Huttunen & Heikkinen interpret the Hegelian State as the social institution with which one feels solidarity, for which one is ready to “give one’s best” and to the values of which one commits oneself12. Thus, the concept of State in this context refers to a unit smaller, greater or of the same size as an actual political state. Huttunen & Heikkinen interpret the Hegelian concept of civil society as community of rights which could refer, for example, to an actual political state or even a criminal league. It is the social institution which gives or rejects the recognition of a full par or a full membership.

In Honneth’s theory, an individual’s self-confidence is established and reproduced in reciprocal relations of friendship and love. If an individual achieves the experience of being loved, she gains a disposition to love oneself and to love other individuals. The experience of

12 See article *Teaching and the Dialectic of Recognition.*
being loved and cared for is a basic precondition for an individual’s identity and morality. After a successful struggle at this level, an individual is ready to strive for higher forms of morality and self-relation (Honneth 1995, 252–256).

At the second level of the struggle for recognition, an individual gains or does not gain legal rights of an adult person – or in the case of deviant socialization, a full membership in a criminal organization. When an individual is recognized at this level, she is accepted as an autonomous person who has both a right and competence to participate in the practical discourse of the institution concerned (state, corporative organization, criminal league, etc.). In the institution concerned, she is considered as a person who has freedom of will and is responsible for her actions. Kant and Durkheim considered this autonomous person as the goal of education. The self-relation that one gains from the experience that she is treated as a mature adult person is self-respect. If an individual never achieves this kind of experience, she cannot function as an autonomous person.

Hegel claims that recognition as an autonomous person is not the highest form of recognition. Individual personhood, freedom and autonomy are granted, but still the individuality of the individual remains abstract and untrue. Individuality in this level is merely a concept (Hegel 1983, 120–123). The person’s autonomy remains abstract until she has the opportunity to perform her freedom and autonomy through work. The issue at the third level of recognition is how the community values a person’s contribution. If the individual is recognized as a person whose contribution to the community (State) is important, then the person gets the experience that she is needed and her work is appreciated. From this experience grows the practical self-relation called self-esteem. In an ideal situation, self-esteemed persons reciprocally recognize each others contribution to the community. From this kind of reciprocal relation of recognition grows solidarity and loyalty (Honneth 2007, 139).

The formation of a democratic attitude requires these three forms of self-relation. In a democratic society we need caring, and only individuals who possess a good self-confidence (capacity to love others and oneself) can care. A democratic society requires reciprocal recognition of legal rights, and only a person who possesses a good self-respect (capacity to know one’s own rights) can recognize the rights of the oth-
ers. And finally, a democratic society requires reciprocal recognition of work (work being paid for, housework, voluntary work, charitable work, animal protection work, and other kinds of autonomous contribution to the community), and only a person who possesses a good self-esteem can recognize the contribution of the others. The formation of self-confidence and self-respect are very much matters of education, the former being a matter of family upbringing and the latter of school education. The formation of self-esteem is only partly a matter of adult education. Mainly it is a matter of normal (in the case of a democratic society) social interaction between adult persons.

The thing which Huttunen & Heikkinen call the positive circle of recognition is the ideal case of reciprocal relation of recognition. In the positive circle of recognition, trust, loyalty and spirit are constructed through a reciprocal relation of recognition. Everybody works for the common good, because they have achieved the experience that their contribution is needed and important. When somebody in the community gains success and receives recognition, others also take pleasure in it, because somebody else’s success and recognition is not “off from me” but quite contrary. The success of one creates possibilities for the others in the community, and one’s success is related to previous successful contributions of other members of the community. A positive circle of recognition creates a strong feeling of solidarity which on the level of the state makes participatory democracy and active citizenship both possible and desired. In a true democracy, everybody’s contribution is valued and even desired.

Unfortunately, a negative and destructive circle of recognition usually prevails on the global, national and local levels. The situation in a negative circle of recognition resembles a Sartrean queue in which individuals are waiting on a line for some goods. Everybody in the queue hopes that the next person will drop out, and everybody takes care that the person behind her will not overtake. This kind of a Sartrean queue is created both by social structures and learned personal

13 How the Huttunen & Heikkinen model has been applied in exceptional teachers’ award system in USA and Canada, see Andrews 2006, 14–15.

14 The positive circle of recognition in a teaching situation corresponds to the situation which Tuomi calls human dignity in the learning environment. It requires, among other things, a diversity-positive milieu in schools, common trusteeship, just treatment and truth seeking without prejudices (Tuomi 2001, 172–178).
attitudes. Undemocratic social structures and undemocratic personal attitudes create a negative circle of recognition in which everybody is either in the situation of the Sartrean queue or, in the worst case, at open war. Individuals struggle for recognition in a situation in which the other person is a rival or even an enemy. In this kind of social context, no true democracy is possible.

In this respect, the nature of the learning community in which individuals learn basic attitudes towards meaningful others and towards strangers\(^\ast\) is very crucial. If the learning community itself works in line with the positive circle of recognition, it gives the learner a good personal disposition (habitus) for participating in democratic procedures and cooperative work. If the competitive spirit of the learning community resembles more a negative circle of recognition, then the prospects for participating in democratic institutions, and the future of democratic institutions itself, are in a bad shape. What if both the democratic attitudes of the members of the society and the democratic social institutions are either underdeveloped or degenerated? In this kind of situation, great challenges are presented to adult education which should make an effort for an emergence of the democratic personal attitude and the hope of a better tomorrow. Fortunately, the situation in most countries in Europe and North America is not that bad, but still there is a clear need for critical adult education. The task of critical adult education in the context of Europe and North America is to contribute to the politics of recognition and the politics of redistribution for the repressed social groups.

Critical adult education should itself work like a learning community in which the positive circle of recognition prevails and subjects aim at unforced common meanings. If a community of adult education (study group) itself works in an undemocratic way and if someone in that community (for example a teacher, an intellectual, an academically educated person, etc.) holds more authority and a more recognized voice than others, then the community just reinforces a social hierarchy instead of empowering itself (see Rancière 1995, 54). For Jacques Rancière, this kind of a community is no start at all for political possibilities and transformative social action. Cathrine Ryther

\(^{15}\) On pedagogical love and pedagogical friendship, see Kakkori & Huttunen 2007.
interprets Rancière in the following way (Ryther 2008; see Ranciere 1991, 7–8):

Ideology critique is no place to start because it requires the setting up of a hierarchy between those who ‘see’ the world as it really is, and those who must be made to see. Those who see the hidden curriculum, who charge themselves with giving that sight to others, are placed in a position of expertise that the ‘others’ can never reach, because in the process of explaining the way things really are what the teacher succeeds in explaining is that others will not understand unless explained to.

To teach critique of ideology with the attitude that only a teacher can really see behind the ideology means the same thing as trying to indoctrinate democracy. Of course, in an adult education group – if there is a teacher – the teacher holds some epistemological authority, but fundamentally his or her view of society and politics is not more correct that anyone else’s. Also, in critical adult education we should avoid indoctrination and follow the idea of a communicative teaching in which the teacher and the learners together participate in the creation of a common meaning. Only on this foundation, critical adult education can inspire persons for authentic political action both in the sense of politics of recognition and politics of redistribution.
1.4 References


2 HABERMAS AND THE PROBLEM OF INDOCTRINATION

2.1 The problem of the criteria of indoctrination

In the philosophy of education, the concept of indoctrination refers to unethical influencing in a teaching situation. Indoctrination means infiltrating (drilling, inculcating etc.) concepts, attitudes, beliefs and theories into a student’s mind by passing her free and critical deliberation. When on a general level we define indoctrination in this way, it is easy to say that the indoctrinative teaching is morally wrong and that teachers or educational institutions should not practise it. The problem is how do we acknowledge indoctrinative teaching? By what criterion do we consider teaching to be a form of indoctrination or to have elements of indoctrination?

The educational philosopher Ivan Snook has divided criteria that have been used in educational literature into four classes (Snook 1972, 1667):

(i) The method of teaching as a criterion of indoctrination. In the U.S. context, thanks to John Dewey, the tendency is to connect indoctrination to a certain teaching method. This illegitimate teaching method is said to include the following elements: a) Teaching is authoritarian, b) Teaching content is drilled in students’ minds, c) There are threading elements in teaching and free discussion is not allowed. Some writers label these as “irrational teaching methods”.

(ii) The content of teaching as criterion of indoctrination. According to the trivial content criterion, the content of teaching determines whether or not teaching is indoctrination. As Anthony Flew put it: “No doctrines, no indoctrination” (Flew 1972, 11).

(iii) The intention of teaching as criterion of indoctrination. The first person to use the term indoctrination in its pejorative sense was William Heard Kilpatrick (see Gatchel 1972, 13). Kilpat-
rick emphasized the intention of the teacher in his concept of indoctrination. He did not deny the possibility of unintentional indoctrination, but nevertheless considered the teacher’s intention to be the most important criterion of indoctrination. John White defines a teacher’s so called indoctrinative intention in the following way: “The child should believe that ‘p’ is true, in a such way that nothing will shake this belief” (White 1972a, 119 and 1973, 179).

(iv) The consequence of teaching as a criterion of indoctrination. When we consider indoctrination in the light of the consequence criterion, we focus our attention to the outcomes of teaching and education. According to this criterion, teaching is indoctrination if the outcome is an “indoctrinated person”. John Wilson claims that an indoctrinated person lives in self-deception. She is a kind of sleepwalker (Wilson 1972, 18). The ground of the beliefs of such a person are believed to be untenable, or beyond rational reasoning. An indoctrinated person holds her conviction despite of the counter evidence.

These four criteria stated in this traditional way include serious problems that could potentially render the entire concept of indoctrination useless in the context of a post-modern teaching situation. I agree with Snook, who claims that indoctrination cannot be defined by certain irrational teaching methods (Snook 1972, 2223). It is clear that when a teacher teaches in an authoritarian style, she tends to produce nondiscursive and indoctrinative learning, although this is a very ineffective way to indoctrinate in a modern teaching situation. It is mainly used in the military, in some private educational institutes, some workplaces and in other so-called “total institutions” (see Peshkin 1986). However, the lack of this kind of teaching does not necessarily remove the danger of indoctrination, which is why I disagree with John Wilson, who insists “it is also logically necessary to the concept of indoctrination that the indoctrinated person arrives at the belief by nonrational methods” (Wilson 1972, 19). The point in the concept of indoctrination is not, nor should it be, the concrete teaching method. The same concrete teaching method (for example, questionanswercircle) can be used either for indoctrinative purposes, or for legitimate educative purposes. But I do not want to reject the aspect of method in the theory of indoctrination.
One might think that problems of method criterion can be overcome by the use of content criterion. According to the content criterion, teaching is indoctrination when the content of teaching consists of “unscientific doctrines,” regardless of teaching methods. This sounds promising, but the problem is how to define the term doctrine. What is the difference between a doctrine and scientific knowledge, quasi-science and true science? Philosophers of science have not reached agreement on this subject, but teachers are expected to be able to discern between a doctrine and an irrational belief. Members of the Vienna Circle claimed that the science is a system of true or justified beliefs (justificationism; in the context of indoctrination, see for example, White 1973). On this matter, I agree with Imre Lakatos, who has written that after the non-Euclidean geometry, non-Newtonian physics and inductive logic “it turned out that all theories are equally unprovable” (Lakatos 1974, 9495). There were good reasons to abandon the scientific justificationism.

Also Karl Popper has clearly demonstrated the incompetence of justificationism. He has created so called criterion of falsification to be used as a demarcation between science and quasi-science. In educational literature, I. Gregory & R. Woods and Tasos Kazepides have revised the content criterion in accordance with Popperian falsificationism. Gregory and Woods claim that unscientific doctrines are such kinds of statements that we can never know are they true or untrue (example political or religious conviction). No new findings or conditions can make a doctrine false. Gregory and Woods call this the “not-known-to-be-true-or-false” property of doctrines. In the case of scientific knowledge, there must be some condition when the statement will be falsified. According to Gregory and Woods, Karl Marx’s political economy was not a doctrinal system in the beginning; afterwards Marxism became a quasiscientific and nonfalsificative doctrinal system (Gregory & Woods 1972).

This Popperian revision of the content criterion also has serious problems. Every scientific theory has some elements that are nonfalsificative. Let us take the Euclidean geometry as an example. From the point of view of falsificationism, one can say that the Euclidian geometry is a doctrinal system, because there is no condition in which it could be falsified. But it would be ridiculous to say that the teaching of the Euclidian geometry represents a form of indoctrination, because it does not include any criterion of falsification.
I am strong agreement with John White, who claims that indoctrinated beliefs need not form a doctrinal system. As White likes to say, “indoctrinated beliefs could be of any kind whatever” (White 1972b). If this is the case, for the purpose of the indoctrination theory, we do not need any demarcation criterion in order to separate doctrines from science.

Ivan Snook’s and John White’s strategy to avoid the problems of method and content criteria is to connect the concept of indoctrination solely to the intention of the teacher. Of course, the teacher is an indoctrinator when she wants to indoctrinate or manipulate students. This type of case is clear (the case of total institution). But how many teachers really want to indoctrinate students? Teachers who have truly understood the ethical codes of teacherhood have no intention of indoctrinating students. So, it is more meaningful to assume that the indoctrination happens unintentionally (by the structural causes). In this case, the traditional formulation of the intention criterion (see White’s definition mentioned earlier) is useless. The intention criterion does not recognise indoctrination that is caused by the institutional or social structures. I presume that in the (post)modern teaching situation indoctrination occurs at the level of hidden curriculum (see Snyder 1973). No teacher or no educational institution openly and intentionally indoctrinates students, although many unreflected attitudes and beliefs (example racist and ethnocentric beliefs that would be rejected in the open and critical discourse) are transferred to the next generation through education.

The traditional formulation of the consequence criterion is also very problematic. It presumes that an indoctrinated person does not change her mind regardless of the counter evidence. But who is to say that a person is indoctrinated? Should an “unindoctrinated rational person” always change her mind when the counter evidence is presented? What amount of the counter evidence is need for a “rational person” to change her mind? Was Einstein an “indoctrinated person,” because he did not accept the quantum physics regardless of the very reasonable counter evidence presented to him? We could also take an example from ethics. If I postulate (and I do not give any rational grounds for doing so) that the “categorical imperative is a pure fact of Reason”, and I believe it to be so regardless of any counter evidence, am I an indoctrinated person?
One way to reconstruct a more actual and useful concept of indoctrination for a modern teaching situation is to apply Jürgen Habermas’s theory of communicative action as Robert Young has done. Young’s Habermasian concept of indoctrination opens up some promising perspectives, but on the other hand Young’s theory has problems of its own. Before focussing on Young’s theory and its problems, we must take short look on Habermas’s concept of ideal speech situation and his theory of communicative action.

2.2 Jürgen Habermas on linguistic interaction

2.2.1 The concept of the ideal speech situation

With the concept of the ideal speech situation Habermas is referring to the idealized conditions of speech. The ideal speech situation refers to the situation where conditions for argumentative action are ideals. This means that in the discourse there is no other force than the force of better argument. There are no inner or outer restrictions that determine the outcome of discourse. Only the force of better argument determines the speech situation. In the ideal speech situation, systematically distorted communication is excluded (Habermas 1984a, 177). In this imaginative yet factually ideal speech situation it is possible to gain consensus about all those subjects that generally are discursive in nature.

Habermas outlines four conditions for his ideal speech situation:

(i) All potential participants in discourse must have equal rights to use speech acts in such a way that discourse could be permanently open to claims and counter claims, questions and answers.

(ii) All participants in discourse must have equal opportunities to present interpretations, to present assertions, recommendations, explanations and corrections, and also equal chances to problematize (problematisieren) or challenge the validity of these presentations, to present arguments for and against. In this way all possible critics are visible and no unreflected prejudices remains.
These two conditions facilitate the free discourse and the pure communicative action in which

(iii) participants, by means of presentative speech acts (repräsentative Sprechakte), equally express their attitudes, feelings and wishes, and also in which participants are honest to each other (sich selbst gegenüber wahrhaftig sind) and make their inner nature (intentions) transparent.

(iv) participants have equal opportunities to order and resist orders, to promise and refuse, to be accountable for one’s conduct and to demand accountability from others. It is only in this way that the reciprocity of actionanticipations (Reziprozität der Verhaltenserwartungen) is realised (Habermas 1984a, 177178; see also Benhabib 1986, 285).

Habermas claims that no empirical investigation or study could ever reveal the facticity of the ideal speech situation, yet it still operates within it. It is a simultaneously real element of the discourse and a counterfactual standard for actual discourse (Habermas 1984a, 180).

Later on Habermas simply stops using the notion of the ideal speech situation and begins referring to the universal presuppositions of argumentation. He starts to speak about “universal conditions of possible understanding” and “general presuppositions of communicative action” (Habermas 1979, 1). In his article *Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification*, Habermas relies on Robert Alex’s formulation of universal presuppositions of argumentation (Habermas 1990, 8889):

(2.1) Every speaker may assert only what he really believes.
(2.2) A person who disputes a proposition or norm under discussion must provide a reason for wanting to do so.
(3.1) Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a discourse.
(3.2) a. Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever. b. Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse. c. Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires and needs.
(3.3) No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising his rights as laid down in (3.1) and (3.2).
In this article Habermas says that now he does not want to specify, renew or change his former notion of the ideal speech situation (Habermas 1990, 88). In his book Between Facts and Norms, Habermas definitely leaves the concept of the ideal speech situation behind and claims that discussion of “the ideal communication community” (Karl-Otto Apel) and “the ideal speech situation” tempts the improper hypostatization of validity claims (Habermas 1996, 323).

2.2.2 Communicative action and speech acts

At the heart of the theory of communicative action is the vision that the modern world-view is differentiated into three parts. This is why nowadays there are better opportunities to come to a mutual understanding. Following Karl Popper, Habermas distinguishes the objective world, the social world and the subjective world. A communicatively competent speaker can independently present differentiated statements concerning any of these three worlds. She can independently evaluate any statement about the world with proper validity claims. There are three validity claims for these three worlds:

(i) Truth (Wahrheit). A claim that refers to the objective world is valid if it is true, i.e. if it corresponds to the reality.

(ii) Truthfulness (Wahrhaftigkeit). A claim that refers to the subjective world is valid if it is honest, i.e. if it has an authentic relationship with the subjective world.

(iii) Rightness (Richtigkeit). A claim that refers to the social world is valid if it does not contradict commonly agreed social norms (Habermas 1984b, 440).

Let us examine the example of the claim “Teachers have right to practice indoctrination in schools”. This claim refers to the social world, and its proper validity claims is rightness (justice). A communicatively competent opponent could challenge this claim by stating that it contradicts that which is commonly considered as morally correct behaviour (or it would be commonly considered as such in a free and critical discourse). If an opponent merely says that “My inner self told me that indoctrination is wrong” (truthfulness or authenticity) or “It is scientifically proven that indoctrination is wrong” (truth), she is using an incorrect validity claim and she is not a communicatively compe-
tent speaker. So, in this case, the proper validity claim is that of rightness or justice.

To understand why Habermas has placed so much emphasis on the demand of mutual understanding, we have to look at Habermas’s theory of social action. First, Habermas divides ideal (pure) types of action into the categories of social and non-social action. An object of non-social action is nature, and the objects of social action are other people. According to Habermas, non-social action is always purposiverational instrumental action: the actor makes use of specific objects for his or her own benefit. Social action can be either successoriented strategic action or understandingoriented communicative action. Strategic action is purposiverational action oriented toward other persons from a utilitarian point of view. The actor does not treat others as genuine persons rather, as natural objects. Strategic action means calculative exploitation, or manipulation, of others. An actor who acts strategically is primarily seeking her own ends and manipulates other people either openly or tacitly. Communicative action is the opposite of strategic action. Communicative action or its pure type means interpersonal communication, which is oriented toward mutual understanding, and in which other participants are treated as genuine persons, not as objects of manipulation. Actors do not primarily aim at attaining their own success but want to harmonise their plans of action with the other participants (Habermas 1984b, 285; see also p. 333.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action Orientation</th>
<th>Oriented to Success</th>
<th>Oriented to Reaching Understanding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Action Situation</td>
<td>Instrumental action</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-social</td>
<td>Strategic action</td>
<td>Communicative action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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**Figure 3.** Pure types of action (Habermas 1984, 285).

Habermas’s most vulnerable claim is that the tendency toward understanding is the immanent telos of speech or the original mode of language use. The instrumental use of language (in other words strate-
Habermas claims that locutionary and illocutionary speech acts are the original features of language usage. If the speaker wants to achieve any kind of perlocutionary effects, she must execute locutionary and illocutionary speech acts in a satisfactory manner. The speaker must achieve socalled locutionary and illocutionary aims before reaching at any perlocutionary ends. Habermas thinks that the perlocutionary aspects of speech do not belong to “the immanent telos” of the speech act. Perlocutionary aspect appears only after people begin to practise instrumental action in the linguistic interaction (that is strategic action). When this happens locutionary and illocutionary aspects of speech are recruited as a means to utilitarian ends (strategic use of language). Strategic action is the kind of linguistic interaction in which one or more speaker wants to produce perlocutionary effects. As such, only a portion of all linguistic interactions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I claim,</th>
<th>that it is raining</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>p</td>
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The performance of this basic form of a speech act means that:

a) The speaker expresses state of affair p (that p), in other words, execute illocutionary speech act;

b) The speaker makes a claim, promise, command, avowal etc., in other words, execute a locutionary speech acts (which is seen in modus “M”) and

c) by carrying out a speech act the speaker produces an effect upon the hearer, in other words, execute a perlocutionary speech act. As Austin himself put it: to say something (p), to act in saying something (M), to bring about something through acting in saying something (Austin according to Habermas 1981, 289).
belongs to the category (pure type) of communicative action. The difficult question is, as will become clear below, whether teaching is communicative or strategic action.

2.3 Robert Young’s critical concept of indoctrination

In sketching the nonindoctrinative and critical concept of teaching and learning, Robert Young constructs the concept of an ideal pedagogical speech situation (IPSS). It is based on Habermas’s theory of the ideal speech situation (ISS) explained above. It also refers to Klaus Mollenhauer’s educational theory (Mollenhauer 1972, 42; see also Masschelein 1991, 134-136). Young interprets Habermas in the following way:

The idea of the ISS is a critical reconstruction of the assumptions of everyday speech communication. It is argued that these assumptions underlie the possibility of speech communication and are universal (…) When we speak we normally act as if a certain situation existed, even though, in fact, it does not. These assumptions are contrafactual (…) for without these assumptions there would be chaos. The assumptions are:
(i) that what we are saying or hearing is intelligible, i.e. is coded according to the usual rules, etc.;
(ii) that what we are saying or hearing is true so far as it implies the existence of states of affairs;
(iii) that the person speaking are being truthful or sincere;
(iv) and that the things said are normatively appropriate considering the relationship among the people and between them the situation they are in.
(Young 1989, 75-76)

For the purpose of ideal pedagogical speech situation, Young defines a perlocutionary speech act as follows: “Perlocutionary action involves a special class of strategic action that in which illocutions are employed as a means to ends other than reaching understanding and freely coordinating action plans in the light of validity claims.” (Young 1989, 106).

Young emphasises that we should not equate perlocutionary utterances with imperative utterances. Imperative utterances form merely
one class of perlocutions. This class of imperative utterances admits of two subdivisions:

Imperatives which appeal to known positive or negative sanctions which the person in power can control (type 2) and imperatives which appeal to a known normative context of legitimate authority (type 1) (…) But there exists another general class of perlocutions which might be called ‘deceptions’ or ‘ulterior purposes’ (type 3). In these, as Strawson has shown, a speaker has to succeed in getting a hearer to accept an illocutionary claim in order to succeed in some further purpose, which must remain concealed.

(Young 1989, 106)

For example, a dishonest car salesman performs speech act type 3 when she is trying to persuade the customer (the perlocutive act) to buy a faulty car by presenting (illoctionary speech act) false statements (locutionary speech act) about its condition. In this way, the car salesman is attempting to successfully achieve a concealed strategic end, the sale of a faulty car at a good price.

With the concept of the ideal pedagogical speech situation, and with types 2 and 3 perlocutions, Young develops his own theory of indoctrinative teaching: “If the ideal pedagogical speech situation (IPSS) is one in which the student is able rationally to assess views or, at least, come to hold them in ‘a manner open to rational assessment’, then only those speech acts which are illocutionary but not perlocutionary (in senses 2 and 3) can characterise the form of action we would want to call ‘educational’ rather than ‘indoctrinatory’.” (Young 1989, 107) Because the difference between “illocutionary and perlocutionary acts (in senses 2 and 3)” is in the teacher’s intention, we can regard Young’s criterion for indoctrination as a communicative version of the intention criterion.

According to Young, it is not possible on the level of empirical pragmatics to show which teacher’s singular speech acts are legitimate (represent true education) and which are illegitimate (represent indoctrination). Perlocutionary intentions become visible in the structure of interaction over time. This is the general weakness of any intention criterion. Intention criterion focus attention on the teacher-student relationship and excludes the aspects of social systems or ideological processes. Young recognises this weakness, although he does not provide any supplementary criterion concerning content or consequence of teaching.
2.3.1 Critique of Young’s criterion of indoctrination

Young’s concept of the ideal pedagogical speech situation is problematic. It is based on Habermas’s theory of the ideal speech situation, which Habermas has abandoned or revised to something else. Both the ideal speech situation and the ideal pedagogical speech situation are ambitious attempts to overcome the historicity, the context dependence of all our concepts. The concept of the ideal speech situation relies on the assumption that there exists some transcendental language game (Karl-Otto Apel), which precedes every actual speech situation. I think that these concepts (ISS and IPSS) contain values and preferences of our time, values that I gladly acknowledge. Nevertheless, conditions of the ideal speech situation are not properties of the transcendental language game. Attempting to promote these conditions to transcendental standards is, however, problematic.

Due the fact that Young’s criteria of indoctrination is a revised version of intention criterion, it has the same limitation that also those theories that rely on teacher’s intention as distinctive feature of indoctrination. Both traditional intention criterion and Young’s revised version do not recognise indoctrination that is caused by social structures and indoctrination that occurs at the level of hidden curriculum. In these cases it may well be that the teacher never use “perlocutionary speech acts in senses 2 and 3” but still some unreflected attitudes and beliefs are infiltrated into students’ minds. The teacher’s intentions may fulfil any requirements of validity, but some structural mechanism could still cause systematically distorted communication in teaching, which eventually leads indoctrination of students.

Another problem is that the teaching is a very special form of human interaction, which is why the concept of the ideal speech situation - and the concept of communicative action as such - may be poorly suited to the act of teaching. Is teaching, in its essence, communicative or strategic action? One could present very convincing arguments in favour of the notion that teaching is not at all communicative action (example Moilanen 1996 and 1998). According to Habermas, interaction is always strategic if perlocutive aims are involved. Where teaching is concerned, one could define didactic aims as perlocutive aims. From this point of view, teaching always remains as a perlocutionary action (in senses 2 and 3), in which the teacher attempts
to influence others (Beeinflussung des Gegenspielers), and the teacher's success can be evaluated by criterion of effectiveness (the validity claim of the instrumental and strategic action). In this respect, teaching is always strategic action and teachers undeniably use perlocutionary speech acts (in senses 2 and 3).

One could also claim that teaching cannot be placed along the axis of communicative-strategic action (see Oelkers 1983 and Kivelä 1996). I would still rely on Habermas's basic concept of interaction (communicative versus strategic action), but in a productive way. I want to introduce the concepts of communicative and strategic teaching, which are not simple applications of Habermas's original concepts. I follow Jan Masschelein's strategy to conceive pedagogical action as simulated communicative action (Masschelein 1991, 145).

I claim that the issue in the problem of indoctrination is not, the question of what kinds of perlocutionary speech acts are legitimate (see also Puolimatka 1995, 153). The problem is more complex, and other aspects of teaching (content and consequence) should also be taken to consideration.

### 2.4 The modified Habermasian concept of indoctrination

I understand communicative teaching to include value orientations in which the teacher commits herself to “universal” presuppositions of argumentation and acts in accordance with these maxims as to the best of her ability (“normative minimum”; Mollenhauer 1972, 42). Pedagogical communication is kind of simulated communicative action and it is more simulated in early stage of education. When a teacher teaches seven years old pupils, the words “to the best of her ability” have different practical consequence than in the case of a teacher teaches twenty years old students. The value orientation is the same, but the practise or application of presuppositions of argumentation is different. When we understand communicative teaching in this way, as an exceptional form of communicative action, the concept of communicative teaching is looser than the concept of communicative action itself. I would like to think that communicative teaching as an exceptional application of communicative action - still remains within the realm of communicative action, although teachers sometimes make
use of “illegitimate perluonary speech acts in senses 2 and 3”. I could imagine that the amount of perlocutive aims - the degree of simulation of the proper discourse - are higher in elementary school than in institutes of higher education, but the value orientation of teaching is still the same in both cases.

In dealing with the dilemma of indoctrination, we should refrain from focusing specific attention on the singular speech acts of a teacher. When the telos of education is to produce mature and communicatively competent people and the content of teaching provides materials for independent and critical thinking, then the teacher may use methods that, when taken out of context, may resemble strategic action and the perlocutive use of language (or may de facto be some form of strategic action depending on how one defines strategic and communicative action).

In this respect, I have set two parallel criteria for indoctrinative teaching: 1) The communicative method and intention criterion; 2) The empowering content and consequence criterion.

2.4.1 The communicative method and intention criterion of indoctrination

Like William Kilpatrick, I think that the most important element in the non-indoctrinative teaching is the respect for other persons. Habermas defines the communicative action as a kind of linguistic interaction in which one's fellow man is considered as a genuine person, and in which aims and ends of action are decided in an environment free and equal discussion. Oppose to this communicative action there is the strategic action in which one treat others as a natural object, solely as a means to an end. I define the strategic teaching, as the kind of teaching in which the teacher treats her students solely as objects, as objects of series of didactical manoeuvres. This strategic teaching is a form of indoctrination (strategic teaching is not same as indoctrination), when a teacher tries to transfer teaching content to the students’ minds, treating them merely as passive objects, not as active co-subjects of the learning process. Then the teaching is in no sense the simulation of the communicative action but the pure strategic action.

I define the communicative teaching, which is based on “The Bildung as a human teaching situation“ ("Bildung als menschlich gültig
Situation“, Schäfer & Schaller 1976, 57) as contradictory to the strategic teaching. The aim is a communicatively competent student who does not need to rely on the teacher, or any other authority for that matter. In the communicative teaching, students are not treated as passive objects but as active learners. In the communicative teaching, a teacher and her students co-operatively participate in the formation of meanings and new perspectives. In the communicative teaching, the teacher does not impose her ideas on the students but rather they make a joint effort to find a meaningful insight regarding the issues at hand. What I refer to as the communicative teaching very closely corresponds with Gert Biesta’s “the practical intersubjectivity in teaching“. Biesta does not understand education “as a one way process in which culture is transferred from one (already accultured) organism to another (not yet accultured), but as a co-constructive process, a process in which both participating organism play active role and in which meaning is not transferred but produced“ (Biesta 1994, 312). Unlike Biesta, I do not consider teaching (no matter how good a teacher is) as a symmetrical communicative action.

The communicative teaching is nearest to the ideal of communicative action that in can get in a real teaching situation. The communicative teaching is a simulation of communicative action, a simulation of a free and equal discourse. It is also a simulation of democracy and democratic mode of action. This means that there could be no communicative teaching in the school, if there exits no kind of practice of a school democracy. Nevertheless, pedagogical action essentially remains as an asymmetrical relationship, because the teacher and her students do not share a common level of communicative competence. Only after a person has completed her education (Bildung) is she prepared to engage in the proper communicative action.

However, even my revised version of the method and intention criterion does not recognize the unintentionally or structurally caused indoctrination. Let us take example the Hitler Jugend assembly Germany in the 1930’s. No matter how communicatively orientated the teacher or the Gruppenlieder was, elements of indoctrination were strongly present. The Hitler Jugend was a very effective training institution, and we cannot gain a comprehensive picture of its operations if we restrict our examination to the teachers’ intentions and methods. In some teaching situations, no matter what a teacher’s intentions and
methods were, the outcome was still an uneducated ("indoctrinated") person. Thus, it is clear that we need aspects of the content and the consequence of teaching.

**2.4.2 The content and consequence criterion of empowerment**

The starting point in the empowerment content criterion is the constructivist view of knowledge (see, for example Berger & Luckmann 1979 and Young 1992). Nowadays, teaching cannot be based on the notion that there exists a group of objective facts, which are deposited into students’ minds like money is deposited in a bank. According to the constructivist view, knowledge is constructed through social processes. Knowledge does not imitate outer reality but rather the system of knowledge is a construction of the reality. When the constructivist nature of knowledge is recognised, higher demands with regard to the teaching content are directed. The teaching content should provide students with opportunities to construct their own creative and multi-dimensional view of reality. The teaching content should also promote students to engage critical self-reflection. Thus, if we want the teaching content to be non-indoctrinative, the teaching content should contribute to students’ reflectivity towards those meaning perspectives that they have already adopted, and as well as toward those that are taught (see Mezirow 1991). The teaching content should not provide any easy answers but rather should improve students’ own power of judgement and capacity for mature deliberation. I consider content that limits students’ meaning perspectives and minimizes as opposed to increases students’ own power of judgement as indoctrinative. In the case of indoctrination, the teaching content tends to keep students at an immature stage. The non-indoctrinative teaching content gives students both the freedom and faculty to determine their own differentiated identity, worldview and conduct of life.

The consequence criterion of empowerment is related to the theories of modern identity and reflective modernity (Beck, Giddens & Lash 1994). The idea of this criterion is to promote such kind of education that contributes to the formation of reflective and relatively open identities. In modern societies, identities are open to a certain extent. In every society, some part of identity is solid as a result of pri-
mary socialisation, but in modern societies, the individual tends to remain somewhat “incomplete“. The modern individual is conscious of her capacity to change her own identity, and she possesses the perspective of many possible identities. This relatively open form of identity produce the pluralisation of life worlds and meaning perspectives. People tend to grow up differently in modern societies. This corresponds with the situation that Emile Durkheim called organic solidarity (Durkheim 1984). In the stage of organic solidarity society need autonomous, independent, critical and professional individual personalities. My claim is that if educational institutions tend to systematically produce closed identities (which are necessary in a traditional society during the stage of mechanical solidarity), we can presume that these institutions impose some form of indoctrination. In modern or post-modern society, educational institutions should encourage a reflective attitude toward one’s own identity.

2.5 Epilogue

Habermas’s theory of communicative action could be a very important - but not sufficient - contribution to the theory of indoctrination. Robert Young was first to apply Habermas to the theory of indoctrination, but Young’s concept of indoctrination has its own inherent problems. Young’s theory concentrates solely on the speech acts of the teacher, which should not be the point in the theory of indoctrination. This is why I present here a revised version of the Habermasian concept of indoctrination and I also supplement it with the content and consequence criterion of empowerment. I have to say that my critique toward Young concerns only a small portion of his larger critical theory of education. With the exception of this concept of indoctrination I am very much in agreement with Young.

My revised Habermasian version of the concept of indoctrination requires the application of a proper theory of a subject and its genesis. The question is: How does a human grow into a mature person with the capacity for critical self-reflection and self-knowledge? Neither Habermas’s theory of communicative action (which includes the socialisation theory) or the traditional analytic philosophy of education (and English sociology of education) provide the theory of a social subject.
Another problem is the question of power in education. According to Michel Foucault:

The individual is no doubt the fictitious atom of an ‘ideological’ representation of society; but he is also a reality fabricated by this specific technology of power that I have called ‘discipline’. (Foucault 1992, 194)

Foucault poses a great challenge to the theory of indoctrination. If the Foucaultian illustration is the whole truth about individuality then the critique of indoctrination is impossible. My aim is to create a critical theory of education that takes into consideration both the aspect of freedom and the aspect of power in the process of socialisation.

2.6 References


ACTION RESEARCH IN THE LIGHT OF JÜRGEN HABERMAS’S THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION AND DISCOURSE THEORY OF JUSTICE

An emphasis on democracy is typical of action research. Therefore, theories of modern democracy can be applied within the field of school development through action research. According to Jürgen Habermas, the promotion of democratic will-formation requires the promotion of free and rational communicative action that is as free from manipulation as possible. Under ideal communicative conditions, consensus is achieved dialectically through the force of a better argument. The principles of rational argumentation have been developed in detail in Habermas’s publications on discourse ethics and in The Theory of Communicative Action. He has recently developed his approach in a book entitled Between Facts and Norms, to which theorists of action research have so far paid little attention. In this book Habermas examines the possibilities for bridging the gap between actual norms and social acceptance of norms in modern society. In traditional society there was no gap between the facticity and the validity of a norm. In modernity, by contrast, a norm is considered valid only if it has been agreed on in free communication between all parties concerned. Action research can support the formation of communication mechanisms that advance collective discursive will-formation. In this sense, Habermas’s recent theorizing offers interesting viewpoints on action research.

Keywords: action research, theory of communicative action, discourse ethics, discourse theory of justice, rational collective will-formation, facticity, validity, school development, curriculum development
4.1 Introduction

The idea of democracy is a central topic in discussions about action research. (Carr & Kemmis 1986; Oja & Smulyan 1989; Zuber-Skerritt 1992; Kemmis 1994; Noffke & Stevenson 1995; Stringer 1996; Kemmis & Wilkinson 1998). Therefore, in our opinion, theories of modern democratic society can be applied to action research. A well-known approach to theorising the different aspects of western democracy is based on the philosophical tradition of critical theory. In this presentation we introduce, from the theoretical point of view of modern law and democracy, a new approach developed by the latest and perhaps the last remarkable figure of classical critical theory, the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas.

Action research is definitely a child of western modernism and the Enlightenment. The program of action research seems to have notable similarities with the project of modernity. Both of them openly preach for a better world for progress and emancipation, more democratic societies, empowerment of the common people, and so on. (Anttonen, Heikkinen & Willman 1998). One of the main tasks of critical theory is to develop appropriate theoretical standards for judging the consequences of modernisation in western democracies the ideas of progress, democracy and emancipation. No wonder, therefore, that critical theory has struck a responsive chord in the hearts of the action researchers.

Critical theory has been elaborated especially by a group at Deakin University, Australia. Within the field of educational action research one can hardly find a research report without a reference to the book Becoming Critical (1986, originally 1983), written by Stephen Kemmis and Wilfrid Carr. In the book, the theoretical approach to action research was based on the latest elaborations of critical theory at the time, namely the theory of knowledge and human interests developed by Jürgen Habermas (1971, originally 1968). This view of action research emphasizes the importance of the collaboration, emancipation and empowerment of people. In this sense the Deakinian approach is close that advocated by Paolo Freire (1970), highlighting the notion of cultural action for freedom.

According to Carr and Kemmis, three different orientations to action research can be specified on the basis of three autonomous inter-
ests of knowledge: **technical**, **practical**, and **emancipatory**. The technical interest of knowledge, according to Habermas, aims at the material reproduction of society, and is closely linked with the positivistic, or sociotechnological, approach to social sciences. **Technical action research** on education aims to increase the efficiency of educational practice and teachers’ professional development, bringing about more effective practices, assessed from the viewpoint of instrumental rationality. The researcher’s role is that of an outside expert who makes an intervention in the society concerned. The practical interest of knowledge is based on the hermeneutical tradition of science; thus, **practical action research** aims to enhance practitioners’ understanding and transform their consciousness. The role of the researcher is a Socratic one, encouraging participation and self-reflection. The emancipatory interest of knowledge aims at emancipation from the dictates and coercion of ideologies, which are intertwined with the traditions and ‘common sense’ in societies. (Carr & Kemmis 1986; Kemmis & a mp; McTaggart 1988; Zuber-Skerritt 1992, 12.)

**Emancipatory action research**, therefore, empowers the people living their lives and working in modern institutions. The emancipatory approach aims to transform these organisations and the educational system. An emancipatory action researcher feels inclined to criticize the bureaucratisation of social systems. His or her task is to act as a ‘process moderator’ who shares responsibility equally with participants. Carr and Kemmis (1986, 116117) call the emancipatory approach *educational*. Later it has also been called **critical** and **empowering** action research. The threefold distribution to technical, practical and emancipatory action research has become a *raison d’etre* of action researchers: an access to the team of ‘real’ action researchers in the dominant action research discourse in Anglo-American societies (Jennings & Graham 1996).

Jürgen Habermas himself, however, made his linguistic turn a long time ago and renewed his approach to the so-called linguistic paradigm, which derives its origin from the philosophy of language, among other sources. The new approach was elaborated in Habermas’s principal work, *The Theory of Communicative Action* (1984, 1987; originally published in 1981). After this, Habermas has been more cautious with the concept of the emancipatory interest of knowledge. In fact, he does not even mention the concept in his later production. However, in our view, the idea of emancipation can well be applied within the
field of action research including its recent theoretical developments because the concept of emancipatory action research is not based on the problematic commitments to philosophy of consciousness – Habermas’s earlier hegelian concepts of reason and freedom.

Habermas’s theory of communicative action has also been applied to action research. Björn Gustavsen’s (1992) version of discourse ethics, elaborated in the concept of democratic dialogue, has become familiar to Scandinavian action researchers. Stephen Kemmis has also discussed the theory of communicative action (Kemmis 1995 ab). Habermas himself has, however, slightly altered his theoretical apparatus after having published his theory of communicative action. In his latest magnum opus, Between Facts and Norms (1996) (orig. Faktizität und Geltung 1992), Habermas develops a theory of modern law and justice, based on the ideas presented in the theory of communicative action. In the book, Habermas discusses the possibilities to constitute legitimate norms in modern society. The new apparatus is closest to the philosophy of justice. Therefore, it is no wonder that fairly few action researchers have become acquainted with it yet.

The basic conceptual polarity in the book is built between the concepts of validity and facticity. The tension between them is caused by the modernisation of society. In traditional society there was no gap between the facticity of a norm and its validity; they were one and the same. Social action was based on conventional morals and on mechanical solidarity. People shared a holistic, religio-ethical or cosmological world view, transmitted by the chain of tradition, and social integration was based on the identity of world views. (Durkheim 1964.)

In traditional society, therefore, there was no difference between the facticity and the validity of a norm. In modernity, however, the unity of law and justice has been eroded. Norms can no longer be founded on some kind of shared basis, as they were in the premodern world neither on the word of God nor on the will of any ruler or authority. Max Weber called the process of the modern pluralisation of world views “disenchantment of the world” and the loss of “sacred canopy” (Regph 1996, xvii). Nowadays norms cannot be based on any shared religious world view or on the concept of natural law. The social integration of people in modern societies is based on positive law, in other words, on explicit agreements which have to be negotiated between people. In modern times, legitimate law is understood only as a result
of free and rational communication between all persons concerned. Thus, modern societies have moved from conventional morality into postconventional morality or into a posttraditional form of a principled morality, as Habermas puts it (1996, 7; 71), applying Lawrence Kohlberg’s theory of morality.

In the modern world norms are founded on democratic and rational will-formation. At the same time, however, the legitimation of law is becoming more and more complicated. To quote William Regh:

Modern societies witness an increasing variety of groups and subcultures, each having its own district traditions, values, and worldview. As a result, more and more conflicts must be settled by reaching explicit agreement on a greater range of contestable matters, under conditions in which the shared basis for reaching such agreement is diminishing. (Regh 1996, xviixviii.)

Therefore, to maintain democracy in these conditions, we should improve policies which promote as free and open discussion as possible free discourse (Diskurs) in the Habermasian sense. In other words, we should improve our practices so as to bridge the growing gap between legitimation and actual norms in society. As the shared basis for reaching a consensus is diminishing, we should try to find practices through which we could act more discursively. In our view, action research could be one way of supporting the formation of communication mechanisms that advance collective discursive will-formation.

Therefore, the discourse theory of law could be useful for action researchers as well. Habermas’s new theoretical developments seem to offer us new opportunities within action research projects and thus help us enhance democracy. But before entering the field of action research, understood as a rational democratic process, we will take a look at the main elements of the theory of communicative action, which are applied and further developed in the discourse theory of law.

4.2 The basics of the theory of communicative action and discourse ethics

At the heart of the theory of communicative action is the concept of communicative action itself. It means interpersonal communication which is oriented towards mutual understanding and in which other
participants are treated as genuine persons, not as objects of manipulation. Actors do not primarily aim at their own success but want to harmonize their action plans with the other participants. Opposite to communicative action is the concept of strategic action, which means calculative exploitation, or manipulation, of others. An actor who acts strategically seeks primarily his or her own ends and manipulates other people either openly or tacitly. (Habermas 1984a, 285; see also p. 333.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action Orientation</th>
<th>Oriented to Success</th>
<th>Oriented to Reaching Understanding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-social</td>
<td>Instrumental action</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Strategic action</td>
<td>Communicative action</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4. The ideal types of action according to Habermas (1984a, 285).

Figure 1 above illustrates the dimensions of the concepts of communicative, strategic and instrumental action. The action is divided into nonsocial action, which is oriented to nature, and social action, which refers to interact ion with people in the social sphere. According to Habermas, nonsocial action is always purposive-rational instrumental action: the actor makes use of specific objects for his or her own benefit. Social action can be either success-oriented strategic action or understanding-oriented communicative action. Strategic action is purposive-rational action oriented toward other persons from a utilitarian point of view. The actor does not treat others as genuine persons but as natural objects.

Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno (1972), in their book Dialectic of Enlightenment, maintain that the rationalisation of society means above all the growth and expansion of instrumental rationality or, in Habermasian terms, the growth of strategic action. Habermas’s view is a bit more optimistic. He states that modernisation promotes both strategic and communicative rationalisation.

The evolution of communicative rationality presupposes the rationalisation and differentiation of world views. This means that the world
(or our view of it) is dividing into three parts: the objective world, the social world, and the subjective world. A communicatively competent speaker can independently present differentiated statements concerning any of these three worlds. He or she can independently evaluate any statement about the world according to any of the three proper validity claims:

1) **Truth** (Wahrheit). A claim that refers to the objective world is valid if it is true, i.e. if it corresponds to reality.

2) **Truthfulness** (Wahrhaftigkeit). A claim that refers to the subjective world is valid if it is honest, i.e. if it has an authentical relationship with the subjective world. Questions like these are dealt with in the so-called practical discourse.

3) **Rightness** (Richtigkeit). A claim that refers to the social world is valid if it does not contradict commonly agreed social norms (Habermas 1984b, 440).

In his discourse ethics, Habermas analyses presuppositions that make conversation possible in general. From these presuppositions he deduces two normative principles of discourse which have to be fulfilled in actual practical discourse if its result a norm, rule, or bill is to be considered valid. The universal presuppositions Habermas has borrowed from Robert Alexy are the following:

(2.1) Every speaker may assert only what he really believes.

(2.2) A person who disputes a proposition or norm under discussion must provide a reason for wanting to do so. (Habermas 1995, 88.)

In addition to these, Habermas argues, we need what he calls a rule of openness.

(3.1) Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a discourse.

(3.2) a. Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever.

   b. Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse.

   c. Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires, and needs.

(3.3) No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising his rights as laid down in (3.1) and (3.2). (ibid., 89)
From these rules Habermas deduces two principles of discourse ethic: the universality principle U and the discourse principle D. In the practical discourse principle U is fulfilled when

All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests (and these consequences are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for regulation) (ibid, 65).

The purpose of the universality principle is to support the tendency of interest generalization. By means of the universal principle, Habermas wants to encourage the participants in the practical discourse to take the view of another person, to engage in a universal exchange of roles, which G. H. Mead called ideal role taking or universal discourse (ibid., 65). The aim of the practical discourse is to find such a norm that everyone can approve regardless of race, sex, age, world view, or even existence meaning that we should take the generations to come into account. The universal principle helps us in the quest for a valid norm in the light of consequences and side effects which can be anticipated at a given moment.

Another principle that Habermas puts forward is the discourse principle D:

Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse. (ibid., 66).

This principle is also founded on universal presuppositions of argumentation. It deals with the procedures of practical discourse. In fact, Habermas says that this procedure actually is practical discourse. According to him, this principle is for mal because it does not provide any substantive guidelines but only sets the procedure for practical discourse:

Practical discourse is not a procedure for generating justified norms but a procedure for testing the validity of norms that are being proposed and hypothetically considered for adoption. That means that practical discourses depend on content brought to them from outside (ibid., 103).

There is no point in engaging in a practical discourse outside the life-world of a specific social group or society in a specific time and place.

This principle also demands that if the validity basis of a factual norm disappears in the course of time perhaps as a result of some
unexpected side effects a new practical discourse must be set up following principle U. In his discourse ethics Habermas does not tell us how we should organize practical or legislative discourse for it to realise principle D, but in his discourse theory of justice he does precisely this. In it he constructs an ideal model of legislation which allows the gap between facticity and validity to be bridged.

4.3 Action research between facticity and validity

In *Between Facts and Norms* Habermas “goes on to develop a yardstick for evaluating modern society”, to quote Kaarlo Tuori (1993a, 2). In the book, Habermas further develops themes which have already been expressed in the theory of communicative action and discourse ethics. He focuses his attention on the question of how valid action norms are possible in a democratic Rechtstaat (constitutional state). For this purpose he develops a conceptual tension between facticity (Faktizität) and validity (Geltung).

The criterion of the validity of norms is the discourse principle D. In *Between Facts and Norms* Habermas just gives a slightly different formulation to the principle:

> Just those action norms are valid to which all possible affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourse (Habermas 1996, 107).

With the concept of “rational discourse” Habermas wants to emphasize that validity can be gained only in a discourse that “takes place under conditions of communication that enable the free processing of topics and contributions, information and reasons in the public space constituted by illocutionary obligation” (Habermas 1996, 10). A totally new aspect here is that Habermas allows some bargaining in practical discourses, but only under the strict regulation of discursively grounded procedures. But the core of discourse ethics remains the same; validity means procedures implied by principle D.

The facticity of a norm refers to different kinds of factual norms. All the laws in a modern state that have been enacted in the right order have a factual status. But the concept of facticity is broader: There are factual norms which have not been written down, which have a status of de facto social acceptance and possess social validity (soziale Geltung) (Regh 1996, xvi; Habermas 1996, 29; 69). Facticity covers unwritten
laws, law-like customs and habits as well. A norm is factual if it has imperative power. On the basis of a factual norm, a person who breaks the rule can be punished, or at least criticized.

In schools, for instance, the facticity of norms is explicitly expressed in the curriculum. It has a factual status which lays down the terms which have to be followed in schools. But the written curriculum is not the one and only factual norm. There are a lot of implicit action norms, which have a factual status. The hidden curriculum consists of factual norms, in spite of the fact that they are not explicitly expressed anywhere (see Broady 1982; Giroux & Purpel 1983). The validity of these norms is based on the de facto social acceptance, however undemocratically the facticity may have been achieved.

The closer the practices of the society are to the ideals of democracy, the narrower is the gap between facticity and validity. In an ideal situation, only valid action norms become factual, achieved through democratic discursive will-formation, and enacted following the discourse principle mentioned earlier. In reality such conditions are never achieved for several reasons. One reason is that we do not know all the possible consequences of a norm at the moment it is enacted; we cannot conceive of all the possible concrete situations in which the norm is going to be applied. Another reason for the inevitable tension between facts and norms is that the communicative action between those concerned never realizes perfectly the validity claims mentioned above. As Jack Mezirow (1990, 11) puts it:

In reality, the consensus on which we depend to validate expressed ideas almost never approximates the ideal. We never have complete information, are seldom entirely free from external or psychic coercion of some sort, are not always open to unfamiliar and divergent perspectives, may lack the ability to engage in rational and critically reflective argumentation, seldom insist that each participant have their freedom and equality to assume the same roles in the dialogue (to speak, challenge, critique, defend), and only sometimes let our conclusions rest on the evidence and on the cogency of the arguments alone.

Thus, the basis of validity of factual action norms is always imperfect and unfinished. The consensus achieved through communicative action is always provisional. Therefore, there is an inevitable tension between the facticity and the validity of action norms. The tension is illustrated in the following figure:
In his discourse theory of justice, Habermas differentiates the discourse principle into the moral principle and the democracy principle. The moral principle measures the legitimacy of norms, and the democracy principle measures the legitimacy of positive justice (Tuori 1993a, 11). Here the moral principle serves the same function as principle U, discussed earlier (Habermas 1992, 140). Now the democracy principle has actually been converted into the discourse principle of justice. Only those laws and statutes are legitimate that are legislated according to the democracy principle. In other words, the moral principle concerns the moral validity of the norms, and the democracy principle concerns the legitimacy of laws and statutes. The processual nature of the democracy principle is illustrated in the model of rational political will-formation below:

**Figure 5.** The tension between factual action norms and the validity in rational democratic will-formation (Habermas 1996, 9091; see also Regh 1996, xvixvii; ).
The process begins with the **pragmatic discourses** in which useful means to given aims are considered. Habermas writes:

Pragmatic discourses extend only to the construction of possible programs and estimation of their consequences (ibid., 165).

If a plan proves to be useful and there is no conflict of interest or values involved, the process continues directly to the moral discourses where the proposed action norm is subordinated to the test of **moral discourses**.

If the proposed action norm (a recommended rule, a bill, a norm, etc.) seems to be problematic because of the diversity of interests, the process continues with **procedurally regulated bargaining** (verfahrensregulierte Verhandlungen)

between success-oriented parties who are willing to cooperate. Bargaining aims at compromises the participants find acceptable under three conditions. Such compromises provide for an arrangement that a) is more advantageous to all than no arrangements whatever, b) excludes free riders who withdraw from cooperation, and c) excludes exploited parties who contribute more to the cooperative effort than they gain from it (ibid., 165-166).
This bargaining is a kind of trading of benefits in the spirit of fair play. The purpose of regulated bargaining is to solve any conflicts of interests in a way that all concerned can approve. The bargaining is regulated and restricted strategic action, where the parties engage in communication to gain a satisfactory negotiated settlement.

When the proposed action norm proves to be problematic from the point of view of value disagreement, ethical-political discourses should be opened up. In these discourses the community discusses the values which are worthy of united effort. The purpose is to clarify those values by which people experience solidarity in a given historical form of life. The ethical-political discourse engages the participants in a process of self-understanding by which they become reflectively aware of deeper consonances (Übereinstimmungen) in a common form of life (Habermas 1996, 165).

Ethical-political discourses clarify those values which constitute the collective identity of a political community (Tuori 1993b, 133).

The purpose of the moral discourses is to confirm that the action norm does not conflict with the demand of generalizable interest. The purpose of the moral discourses is to guarantee that the achieved consensus on the proposed action norm accords with the private interests of all concerned and that the world views or ethical commitments of any party are not excessively violated. If the result of earlier discourses is not consistent with the generalizable interest, the ethical-political discourses or procedurally regulated bargaining should be resumed. If the proposed action norm is consistent with the common interest, the process continues into legal discourses. In these discourses between juridical experts the internal consistence of the combination of action norms is checked. All the resolutions of earlier phases have to be tested for legal coherence and certainty. This phase is indispensable because political legislature may use its lawmaking powers to justify only those norms (or legal programs) that are compatible with the existing legal system or the corpus of established laws (Habermas 1996, 168).

4.4 Action research in schools as rational democratic will-formation

The process model of rational political will-formation has originally been developed to describe the process of making laws. The model can
also be applied to participatory action research. As illustrated above, the earlier paradigms of Habermas’s production have been applied in action research quite successfully. The concepts of facticity and validity and the inevitable tension between them help disclose some new aspects of democratic will-formation in schools.

The better the discourse principle can be followed in discussions about ways of developing primary education, the narrower is the gap between the facticity and the validity of the curriculum. Curriculum planning in schools resembles the model of rational collective will-formation. This is especially clear in Finland, where a lot of work for the development of the curriculum is being done in schools. The status of the curriculum in schools can be compared to the status of law in societies: it is a collection of official documents which define norms of action and regulate social integration. Therefore, as illustrated in Figure 4, developing a curriculum is like enacting a law in a modern society, but on a miniature scale.

As we discuss ways of developing primary education, a pragmatic discourse is being performed. We ask the question: What should be done in schools? The result of the discourses is a provisional consensus is being crystallized both in the official curriculum and in the actual practices in schools. Thus, the different aspects of facticity and validity can be distinguished in the curriculum in precisely the same way as in the legal system.

According to the national directives for curriculum development in Finnish schools, the laying out of the curriculum should start with a discussion of the basic values on which school education is based. In other words, the pragmatic discourse preconceives ethical-political discourses about basic values. In these discourses, we ask ourselves:

What are the values on which the practices in schools are based on?

Curriculum development also includes stages of procedural regulated bargaining between the different parties. There are several groups which take part in these negotiations in accordance with their special interests, such as teachers, who present their own viewpoints on the subjects or branches of science in the curriculum. The negotiations between different groups are accomplished through strategic action, as described in section II above. The idea of procedural regulated bargaining does not require adherence to the strictest possible demands of communicative action. The parties may choose arguments that are
advantageous to them and act strategically towards each other. However, according to the ideal model of political will-formation, the negotiations are procedurally regulated: every party has an opportunity to enter claims, and they have to be taken into account.

**Figure 7. The process model of rational collective will-formation in developing a curriculum through action research.**

All the results achieved in previous stages of will-formation still have to be checked. The outcomes have to be accepted in moral discourses,
where the action norms are considered in the light of generalizable interests. In moral discourses in schools we ask ourselves the question: “Does the final outcome of the earlier discourses promote such interests that are generalizable, so that all parties concerned can accept them as their own?” In schools such discussions are taking place, inter alia, at meetings of teaching staff and of the school board.

In the final stage, the curriculum goes through legal discourses. The compatibility of the combination of action norms in the curriculum has to be checked. In juridical discourses we ask ourselves: “How integrated a whole is the combination of all the factual action norms, including all the factual laws, statutes, statutory regulations, directives and the curricula of other schools?” If any contradictories or incompatibilities are detected, some part of the whole has to be adjusted: a new process of discourses has to be launched.

The process of making legitimate action norms never ends. Combining different norms and negotiating about them is an unending process. The basis of validity of factual action norms is always imperfect and unfinished, and the consensus achieved through the process is always provisional. The inevitable gap between the facticity and validity of action norms remains, but the tension between them is at the same time a source of a new processes of will-formation.

4.5 Conclusions: towards a more sophisticated theory of democracy in action research?

*Between Facts and Norms* can be regarded as a concession in Habermas’s ambitious discourse ethical project. In his earlier theorizing, Habermas strictly held to the validity claims of truth, truthfulness and rightness in the theoretical developments of discourse ethics and the theory of communicative action. Strategic action had been relegated to the status of a parasite in his idea of communication. Now, however, he ‘accepts’ the role of strategic action within certain limits within the concept of procedurally regulated bargaining. Thus, the result seems more realistic than his earlier theoretical models, which had illustrated more ideal situations for communication.

In everyday practices, we cannot close our eyes to actual strategic negotiations between interest groups. Therefore, in our opinion, the process model of rational political will-formation seems fruitful for
action researchers. It helps us take the forms of strategic action into account in theorising about action research in actual conditions. Thus, the reconstructed version of the theory of communicative action— the discourse theory of law—allows us to delineate a more realistic model of democracy in action research.

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